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In the preface to The Economic Structure of Tort Law,' Professor
William Landes and Judge Richard Posner claim that theirs is "the first
book-length study of the economics of tort law.' 2 In accomplishing this
feat they barely outstripped Professor Steven Shavell, whose Economic
Analysis of Accident Law3 also was published in 1987. The joint appear-
ance of these books is fitting for a number of reasons. The books together
synthesize the contributions of economic analysis that have increasingly
dominated the legal literature of tort law during the last 15 years.4 The
authors are uniquely qualified to provide this synthesis as their own pro-
digious scholarship encompasses a startlingly broad array of tort topics.5
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1 W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) [hereinafter
LANDES & POSNER].
2 Id. at vii.
3 S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987) [hereinafter SHAVELL].
4 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 4-9.
5 See, ag., W. LANDES & R. POSNER, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF INTENTIONAL TORTS (1981);
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The juxtaposition of their publication benefits both works-as the
books are better viewed as complements than as substitutes. While each
book begins by laying out the same simple models of tortious behavior,
the books represent starkly different and competing visions of tort eco-
nomics. This is true not only because several chapters of each book are
derived from the authors' specific contributions to the field, but more
basically because the authors have fundamentally different approaches to
combining law and economics.
Landes and Posner boldly assert their thesis in their book's first sen-
tence: "IT]he common law of torts is best explained as if the judges...
were trying to promote efficient resource allocation."' 6 The goal of their
book is to test this positive economic theory by analyzing common law
decisions to see if the rules there expounded are efficient. 7  Shavell's
work, in contrast, has no unified thesis to defend. His approach is to
develop a variety of tort models, but to let the reader, for the most part,
decide which models' assumptions most closely fit a particular factual
context. 8 In developing these models, Shavell pays more attention than
Landes & Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1985);
Landes & Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 417 (1984); Landes & Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 109 (1983); Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REv. 851
(1981); Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
517 (1980); Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers: An Economic
Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978). See also, e.g., Shavell, Uncertainty over
Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J. L. & ECON. 587 (1985); Shavell, Liability for
Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984); Shavell, A Model of the Optimal
Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J. ECON. 271 (1984); Shavell, Tort in Which the
Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially, 26 J. L. & ECON. 589 (1983); Shavell, On Liability and Insur-
ance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120 (1982); Shavell, The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a
Costly Legal System, I 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982); Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope
of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980); Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negli-
gence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980); Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. ECON. 541
(1979).
6 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 1.
7 Landes and Posner call their hypothesis "the positive economic theory of tort law because no
rival positive economic theory of tort law has been proposed." Id. at 1 [emphasis in original]. Their
positive theory of torts shares interesting similarities with critical legal theories. Both types of theo-
ries can make positive predictions about legal texts. See, e.g., Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction
of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L. J. 997, 1000 (1985) ("Contract law describes itself as more private
than public, interpretation as more objective than subjective understanding, consideration as more
about form than about substance."). Both are also susceptible to the criticism that the authors may
only choose to analyze judicial decisions that favor the maintained hypothesis.
8 The authors have also structured their books differently. Landes and Posner have integrated
their economic models into the narrative of each chapter. Shavell conversely has a separate mathe-
matical appendix for each chapter, as well as parallel notes on the literature, and the legal rules of
different countries.
The uniformity of Shavell's presentation has a double-edged quality. While the structure makes
Shavell's work a better reference by allowing readers to quickly locate the model or literature sum-
mary they seek, the bifurcation of narrative and appendix breaks the flow of his argument at times,
especially in comparison to the lucid prose of Landes and Posner. Having the mathematical appen-
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do Landes and Posner to systematically analyzing alternative assump-
tions, and more attention to how changing these assumptions can affect
the operation of different liability rules.9
Perhaps the difference in the books' methodologies can most easily
be seen by contrasting their views of liability rules with that of John
Prather Brown. In 1973, using a simple economic model of torts, Brown
demonstrated that strict liability, negligence, and contributory negligence
could be equally effective in efficiently deterring injurer negligence.' 0
Working in the wake of this influential early piece, Landes and Posner
have what might be considered an embarrassment of riches." And in-
deed, at times they need to rely on ancillary costs, such as the adminis-
trative costs of litigation, to argue that one liability rule is superior to
another.12
In sharp contrast to Brown's equivalence theorem (and to Landes
and Posner's positive theory), Shavell is responsible for what might be
called an impossibility theorem. For in iniroducing the effect of "activity
levels" into the analysis,13 Shavell demonstrates that under certain as-
sumptions no liability rule can induce the socially efficient amount of
care:
[N]o rule... induces both injurers and victims to choose optimal levels of
their activities.... The reason, in essence, is that for injurers to choose the
correct level of their activity they must bear accident losses, whereas for
victims to choose the correct level of their activity they too must bear acci-
dent losses. Yet injurers and victims cannot each bear accident losses.' 4
Thus, in looking at the same economic phenomena as Landes and Pos-
ner, Shavell not only fails to endorse the efficiency of the common law,
but suggests situations in which efficient outcomes are unattainable.' 5
The authors' differences are also reflected in their attitudes toward
dix in the back sometimes makes the textual narrative sound conclusory with the guts of the argu-
ment separated into the appendices' mathematical proofs.
And while Shavell systematically lays out the literature in sections at the end of the chapters
and the appendices, he often addresses current academic controversies in the text without directly
acknowledging his academic adversary. The uninitiated reader thus gets the feeling at times of hear-
ing only half the debate. See, eg., SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 17 (discussing least-cost avoider); id. at
30 (discussing the reciprocal nature of harm).
9 For example, Shavell discusses how consumers' perception of risk, id. at 54, or insurers' abil-
ity to monitor insureds' due care level, id. at 211, alters the analysis.
10 Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 323 (1973).
11 Brown's equivalence result could alternatively be viewed as a boon to the efficiency theory of
the common law. After all, how could the common law go wrong if so many forms of liability can
be efficient? Within this set of equally efficient common law rules, however, the positive economic
theory of Landes and Posner is inherently indeterminant.
12 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 82.
13 See Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
14 SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 29.
15 See also id. at 211 (describing insurance equilibrium in which insurers cannot observe injurers'
level of care).
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comparative negligence. Shaven concludes that "no persuasive theoreti-
cal argument" supports preferring contributory negligence over compar-
ative negligence on efficiency grounds. 16 Both liability rules can perform
the prime objective of inducing optimal levels of due care.' 7 For Shavell,
the two liability rules can only be distinguished by "rather subtle" and
offsetting differences: contributory negligence should have lower admin-
istrative costs, while comparative negligence should spread risk more effi-
ciently.1 8 Landes and Posner, however, describe the movement to
comparative negligence as "a contradiction to the positive economic the-
ory of tort law." 19 Because Landes and Posner assume away risk-aver-
sion,20 the risk-spreading advantage of comparative negligence is
eliminated2' and the higher administrative costs of apportioning damages
makes comparative negligence rules inefficient. Thus, in describing one
of the most important recent changes in American tort law, Shavell re-
mains theoretically agnostic, while Landes and Posner give witness to
definitive conviction.
In fact, for Shavel the whole enterprise of trying to determine
whether or not tort law is, on balance, efficient is "not especially fruit-
ful."' 22 His most general reaction to Landes and Posner's efficiency hy-
pothesis is contained in his conclusion:
[N]ot only does there seem to be considerable consistency, but there also
seems to be substantial ambiguity and inconsistency between the liability
system that we observe and the regime that is best given the criteria of
optimality and the models examined here.23
Although Shavell's agnosticism is less inspiring, it lends a certain objec-
16 Id. at 294.
17 This result, extending Brown's equivalence theorem, was first developed by David Haddock
and Christopher Curran. See Haddock & Curran, An Economic Theory of Comparative Negligence,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1985).
18 SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 294 n.2.
19 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 82. This "contradiction" is not truly at odds with their
larger theory that legislatively made law tends to be inefficient, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS OF LAW xx (1986), as 35 of the 42 adopting states have adopted comparative negligence by
statute. Indeed, the statutory movements toward both comparative negligence and contribution oc-
casion an example of extremely suspect econometric analysis in which Landes and Posner purport to
test whether states that "weight efficiency heavily (as judged by their public policies)" are less in-
clined to legislatively adopt these inefficient rules. After falling to describe two of the regressands,
the authors report regressions with R-squares of.02 (with coefficient t-statistics no greater than 1.74)
and conclude there is "a positive and significant relationship between [government inefficiency vari-
ables] and the probability that a state allows contribution." LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 221-
22.
20 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 55-58. For a criticism of this assumption see Balkin, Too
Good to be True, (Book Review), 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1447-1483 (1987).
21 Landes and Posner acknowledge that "if potential victims and injurers are risk averse .... if
insurance is unavailable, and if the cost of apportionment is small, the sharing of the damages may
be preferable to having one party bear all the losses." LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 82.
22 SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 294 n.3.
23 Id. at 294.
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tivity to his analysis-he has no commitment to look for specific results.
While Landes and Posner's stated goal is explicitly non-normative, there
is the risk that in testing their efficiency theory they have become emo-
tionally invested in its conclusions. Indeed, at times it seems that they,
much more than Shavell, are laboring under some kind of burden to find
efficiency explanations of common law rules.
This is nowhere clearer than in Landes and Posner's analysis of the
common law's refusal "to impose liability for failure to assist a stranger
in distress no matter how low the costs of assistance would be or how
great its benefits." 24 Landes and Posner trot out an elaborate model to
suggest that this common law rule -of no liability may be efficient even
when encouraging rescue is efficient. They argue that imposing liability
on potential rescuers will cause them to avoid activities in which they
might encounter a duty to rescue-so that there might actually be less
rescuing if liability is imposed. A closer look at their model, however,
leads to exactly the opposite conclusion. The assumption that potential
rescuers will be motivated by the potential of liability to change their
behavior indicates that they would fail to rescue if they came upon a
victim and there was no threat of liability. Thus, within their model
there would be no rescues in a no-liability world, because potential rescu-
ers encountering a victim would not choose to incur the costs of rescue.
Landes and Posner must compare a zero-rescue equilibrium under the
no-liability rule with possibility of rescue (albeit with ex ante substitu-
tion) under the liability rule. Since something is always bigger than noth-
ing, the logic of their model indicates that the common law rule is
inefficient. 25
In criticizing Landes and Posner's test of common law efficiency,
however, one should not lose sight of the fact that their goal is more
interesting and more difficult than Shavell's. Shavell's approach has the
analytic attraction of correctness-given the assumptions of his models,
his conclusions necessarily follow. But Shavell does not take the addi-
tional step of testing his models' empirical implications. Taking this diffi-
cult step to empiricism is the core of Landes and Posner's enterprise.
Instead, Shavell is content to describe in an analytically rigorous fashion
testable (but untested) implications of many different models. Thus, if
Landes and Posner are hedgehogs who know one thing (but very well)
and Shavell is a fox who knows many,26 it is important to emphasize that
24 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 143.
25 Indeed, Landes and Posner compound this error by praising the common law exceptions to
the no-duty-to-rescue doctrine (involving for example the duty of a railroad to assist an ill passen-
ger). As the authors correctly point out, all the common law exceptions "involve an actual or poten-
tial contractual relationship." Id. at 147. But this means that the common law only imposes a duty
to rescue in those situations in which it is least necessary-as these potential victims can contract ex
ante for their rescue.
26 See I. BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox 1, 2-4 (1953). Berlin developed the
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their knowledge stems from different sources. Landes and Posner's mon-
olithic view of efficiency, although theoretically informed, is known em-
pirically, 27 while Shavell's conclusions are derived from purer theory.28
In his conclusion, Shavell asserts that the value of his book will "de-
pend on whether the assumptions studied capture important elements of
reality, on the degree to which the analysis helps to organize thought
about the effects of liability and the insurance system, and on the extent
to which the analysis identifies effects that the reader does not consider
obvious."'29 Both books abundantly succeed when tested against these
criteria. The authors provide provocative and insightful foundations for
an economic knowledge of our liability system. But beyond this consid-
erable achievement, the products are clearly differentiated as the authors
set about their tasks in different ways. For those who think that eco-
nomic analysis must yield uniform or uniformly conservative conclu-
sions, these books will offer methodological insights into the variety of
ways there are to "do economics."
Finally, I would suggest that the next wave of economics research
should more carefully model the production of torts. Other areas of eco-
nomics have developed elegant and tractable expressions for a wide vari-
ety of production functions.30 Many of the economic models of torts can
be reconceived as classical production functions that transform certain
inputs, such as the parties' due care, into a product, such as the expected
damage of a tort. While many tort models currently turn on the explicit
nature of tort production, 31 the tort literature has generally failed to ad-
dress issues of economies of scale or scope in the production of torts that
has been central to analysis of production in other economic arenas.32
hedgehog/fox dichotomy from a line of the Greek poet Archillechus which says, "The fox knows
many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing." Id. at 1.
27 More specifically, their empirical approach entails a comparison of what the positive law is
with a prior theoretical determination of what an efficient rule would be. Indeed, Berlin's hypothesis
that "Tolstoy was by nature a fox, but believed in being a hedgehog" might aptly be extended to
Landes and Posner's positive theories. For while they wish to focus u1pon common law efficiency, it
is in the telling of their individual stories that they, like Tolstoy, show their true strength.
28 Witness, for example, Shavell's unqualified conclusion that if there is no uncertainty over
injurers level of care, injurer's will not purchase liability insurance. SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 212.
29 Id. at 291.
30 A production function is a mathematical formula expressing how inputs may be transformed
into outputs.
31 See, eg., SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 17 (describing least cost avoider); LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 5, at 210-14 (describing joint care and alternative care).
32 See generally W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR AND R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 67-93 (1982).
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